Art. 28
General principles
EU controller (VOLTAGE EI, France). ICT risk management framework documented. Single point of contact for the financial entity.
VoltageGPU runs every confidential AI agent inside Intel TDX hardware enclaves with per-request ECDSA attestation, providing direct evidence for DORA Articles 28-30 contractual obligations. Hardware-sealed processing addresses confidentiality, integrity and availability requirements. EU controller (VOLTAGE EI, France, SIREN 943 808 824) limits critical ICT third-party concentration risk concerns under Article 31.
ICT third-party arrangements that satisfy Articles 28-30. Operational resilience by hardware. Attested incident evidence aligned with Article 17 reporting.
DORA scope
DORA has been applicable since 17 January 2025. It covers virtually every regulated financial entity in the EU plus their ICT third-party providers. AI inference providers serving financial workflows are ICT third parties under DORA — meaning the financial entity must contractually flow through Articles 28-30 obligations to the AI vendor, including audit rights, exit strategy and incident reporting.
Articles 28-30 — ICT third-party arrangements
Article 30 lists the contractual provisions DORA requires from any ICT third-party arrangement. Most are organisational (location, audit, exit). Two are technical — confidentiality and integrity of data — and these are the ones most AI vendors struggle to evidence on standard infrastructure. Hardware sealing answers them with cryptographic proof per request.
Art. 28
General principles
EU controller (VOLTAGE EI, France). ICT risk management framework documented. Single point of contact for the financial entity.
Art. 29
Preliminary assessment of concentration risk
Sub-processor list limited to Targon (compute) and Chutes (TEE inference). Financial entity can substitute providers without losing TDX guarantees.
Art. 30(2)
Confidentiality of data
Intel TDX with AES-256 memory encryption, NVIDIA Protected PCIe. Operators technically incapable of reading prompts or inference outputs.
Art. 30(2)
Integrity and availability
Per-request ECDSA attestation bound to enclave measurement. Tamper-evident logs. Multi-region failover within EEA.
Art. 30(2)
Audit rights
Customer-verifiable attestation per request. Written audit reports on demand. Right of inspection via the financial entity's designated auditor.
Art. 30(3)
Exit strategy
Open-weight base models (Qwen3, DeepSeek). LoRA adapters returned encrypted with the customer's public key. No vendor lock-in on weights or data.
Operational resilience
DORA Article 5 requires a robust ICT risk management framework. Article 17 mandates ICT-related incident reporting to competent authorities within tight deadlines. Per-request attestation gives your incident responders an immediate, cryptographically verifiable timeline of every AI invocation — material evidence for the major incident classification under Commission Delegated Regulation 2024/1772.
Tamper-evident audit trail
Every request signed by the enclave. Forensics get cryptographic proof of what ran, when, and on which model version.
EU-only data path
Inference path stays inside EEA. No US sub-processor can be subpoenaed under FISA 702 or CLOUD Act.
Hardware-sealed integrity
CPU-fused memory keys block tampering even by a malicious hypervisor. The threat model assumes the host is hostile.
DORA FAQ
Credit institutions, payment institutions, e-money institutions, investment firms, crypto-asset service providers, central counterparties, trading venues, insurance and reinsurance undertakings, insurance intermediaries, IORPs, credit rating agencies, crowdfunding service providers, securitisation repositories — and ICT third-party service providers serving any of the above. DORA has been applicable since 17 January 2025.
Yes. AI inference services that support, enable or contribute to a financial activity are ICT services under DORA Article 3(21). The financial entity must therefore flow through DORA Article 28-30 obligations to the AI vendor, including audit rights, exit strategy and incident reporting cooperation.
Yes. We provide ICT third-party agreements aligned with DORA Articles 28-30. Hardware sealing through Intel TDX directly evidences confidentiality and integrity. Per-request ECDSA attestation gives the financial entity a tamper-evident audit trail. Exit strategy is supported by open-weight base models and customer-encrypted LoRA adapters.
Our sub-processor list is limited to Targon (compute) and Chutes (TEE inference). Both EU-aligned, both substitutable. The hardware-sealing layer means the financial entity is not locked into any one provider — TDX attestation evidence is portable across compatible operators.
If we reach the thresholds set by the European Supervisory Authorities, yes — and in that case we would be subject to direct oversight by ESAs. The technical architecture (hardware sealing, EU jurisdiction, attestation) is already aligned with the obligations Article 31 designation would impose.
Related compliance pages
Article 12, 14, 15 and 32 obligations enforceable from 2 August 2026.
Article 28 native DPA, Article 32 confidentiality.
Essential and important entities, supply chain security.
Sample attestation log JSON, retention and API access.
Vertical agents for legal, finance and regulated professionals.
Verify any request against the public attestation root.
Intel TDX, Protected PCIe, attested GPUs as raw compute.
AML, KYC, DORA and SOX-aligned agent workflows.
Full agent line-up across legal, finance, healthcare and operations.
Article 28-30 contractual provisions on signing. Article 32 confidentiality by hardware. Article 17 evidence by construction.